

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 20, 2019

TO: Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman, Resident Inspector
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending September 20, 2019

235-F: DOE approved the SRNS Safety Basis Strategy for the next two safety basis revisions. The first revision is to reflect the reduction in material-at-risk and a revised fire scenario to support the downgrading of safety functions to 1+ structures, systems, and components (SSC) that mitigate consequences for the collocated worker. Active SSCs that protect the facility workers and passive SSCs would not be changed. The second revision will reflect the facility end state prior to the initiation of intrusive decommissioning. The facility deactivated state will include the isolation of energy sources and limited access for workers (e.g., annual physical inspections). Planned ventilation studies would support E5 as the only motive force for exhaust ventilation.

Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF): Parsons conducted four proficiency drills between July and September for their five shifts. Parsons is planning to conduct five additional full scale drills through November. Parsons intends to have their joint Management Self-Assessment/ Implementation Verification Review and the contractor Operational Readiness Review (ORR) teams observe the October 3 exercise. The former team will be helping Parsons achieve readiness while the latter team would be verifying readiness (see 6/21/19 report).

DOE informed Parsons that Parsons has not delivered a corrective action plan (CAP) to address deficiencies in their Emergency Management System by the requested date (see 9/6/19 report). Furthermore, DOE stated that the draft CAP is unacceptable as it lacks detail of specific deficiencies and the related actions to be taken. For example, the draft CAP did not include all the required actions, milestones, training and deliverables associated with each issue or discuss causal factors for each issue. Some of the actions were not scheduled to be completed until November 2019. DOE stated that until an acceptable CAP is delivered and adequately implemented, DOE will not support any evaluated emergency exercises. The Parsons drill schedule and corrective actions will drive when the DOE ORR team will observe an exercise.

SWPF Integration: SRR completed their Implementation Verification Reviews for the integration of the Defense Waste Processing Facility and Saltstone with SWPF. There were 5 findings for DWPF and none for Saltstone. Training issues were identified at both facilities.

Saltstone: After evaluating other options, SRR is now planning to monitor flammable gases in the vapor space of Saltstone Disposal Units after grout pours and turn on a to-be-installed active ventilation system once flammable gases reach a to-be-determined concentration.

H-Canyon: After last week's drill (see 9/13/19 report), H-Canyon gave the shift technical engineers additional training on event classification and developed other corrective actions.

Tritium Extraction Facility: The resident inspector accompanied operators while they performed glovebox oxygen and hydrogen monitor rounds and auxiliary operator rounds.