



00-0000019

**Department of Energy**

Washington, DC 20585

January 18, 2000

RECEIVED  
00 JAN 19 PM 1:48  
DNF SAFETY BOARD

The Honorable John T. Conway  
Chairman  
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board  
625 Indiana Avenue, NW  
Suite 700  
Washington, D.C. 20004

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed is the Department's plan for reviewing the effectiveness of our recently revised corrective action process. This plan is a deliverable to you under Commitment 5.1.3 of the Department's Recommendation 98-1 Implementation Plan (IP). Mr. Mosi Dayani will brief the planned approach at the January 20, 2000 Board public meeting on integrated safety management.

If you have any questions concerning this information, please contact me at (202) 586-1418 or Mosi Dayani at (803) 725-7721.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Theodore A. Wyka".

Theodore A. Wyka  
Director, Safety Management  
Implementation Team

Enclosure

cc: Mark Whitaker





# Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

January 18, 2000

00 . 19

## MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

Ted Wyka, Director,  
Safety Management Implementation Team

SUBJECT: Review of Oversight Issue Resolution Process Implementation

The attached Review Plan will be used to review the effectiveness of Department-wide implementation of the oversight issue resolution process, developed in accordance with the Department's March 1999 implementation plan. The verification team, led by Mr. Mosi Dayani of Savannah River Site, will aggregate results of site-based ISM verifications, sample performance at a few selected sites and headquarters, and prepare a summary report on the effectiveness of the Department's recently revised corrective action process. The review approach was designed to have minimal impact on field operations, while providing the necessary confirmation of effective implementation.

ISM Verification Team Leaders for all verifications to be conducted henceforth should integrate the Criteria and Review Approach Documents (CRADs) in the attached plan with other CRADs developed as part of scheduled ISM verification activities, and provide relevant results to Mosi Dayani.

I would like to thank Mosi and his team for developing an excellent review plan. Please call me at (202) 586-1418, or Mr. Dayani at (803) 725-7721, should you have any questions concerning the attached plan. I thank you in advance for your continuing support.

Attachment

RECEIVED  
00 JAN 19 PM 1:48  
DNF SAFETY BOARD



Ted Wyka to Distribution  
January 18, 2000

Distribution:

Certified ISM Verification Team Leaders

98-1 Verification Team Members

M. Dayani, SR  
J. Adachi, CH  
H. Bohrer, ID  
R. Singh, DP  
H. Himpler, EM

cc:

T. Gioconda, DP-1  
D. Reicher, EE-1  
D. Michaels, EH-1  
C. Huntoon, EM-1  
R. Gee, FE-1  
W. Magwood, NE-1  
L. Barrett, RW-1  
M. Krebs, SC-1  
R. Glass, DOE-AL (Albuquerque Operations Office)  
R. San Martin, DOE-CH (Chicago Operations Office)  
B. Cook, DOE-ID (Idaho Operations Office)  
K. Carlson, DOE-NV (Nevada Operations Office)  
L. Dever, DOE-OR (Oak Ridge Operations Office)  
J. Turner, DOE-OAK (Oakland Operations Office)  
S. Brechbill, DOE-OH (Ohio Operations Office)  
K. Klein, DOE-RL (Richland Operations Office)  
R. French, DOE-ORP (Office of River Protection)  
J. Roberson, DOE-RF (Rocky Flats Field Office)  
G. Rudy, DOE-SR (Savannah River Operations Office)  
E. Livingston, OSE  
M. Whitaker, S-3.1  
J. Hassenfeldt, S-3.1  
D. Stadler, EH-2  
W. Miller, EH-2  
SMIT Points of Contact

**REVIEW PLAN  
FOR  
VERIFYING EFFECTIVE  
IMPLEMENTATION  
OF  
THE PROCESS FOR RESOLVING ISSUES  
IDENTIFIED BY THE OFFICE OF  
OVERSIGHT**

Developed by:

*Mosi Dayani* 1/14/2000

Mosi Dayani, Team Leader

Approved:

*Ted Wyka* 1/14/2000

Ted Wyka, Director, SMIT

# **REVIEW PLAN FOR VERIFYING EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCESS FOR RESOLVING ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY THE OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT**

## **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

The Department's process for addressing and resolving independent oversight findings is an important and integral component of the Feedback and Improvement function within the Integrated Safety Management (ISM) System. On March 10, 1999, the Secretary issued an implementation plan for DNFSB Recommendation 98-1 formulating a process to address and resolve safety issues identified during internal independent oversight reviews. This plan also called for a verification of the effective implementation of that process. The process described in the plan, although it responds to concerns raised by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) in its Recommendation 98-1, will apply to all DOE activities subject to review by the DOE Office of Oversight (EH-2), not just defense nuclear facilities.

According to the implementation plan, the verification review needs to determine the following:

- Whether the process described in the plan has been effectively incorporated into identified Department directives;
- Whether the process has been effectively applied, based on review of a sample of recently issued Office of Oversight assessment reports;
- Whether the process has been effectively applied, based on review of the Department's response to at least one multi-organization, multi-CSO safety issue identified by the Office of Oversight, and
- Confirm effective integration of the process into the ISM system.

The DOE Responsible Manager for this implementation plan is Mr. Theodore Wyka, the Director of the Safety Management Implementation Team (SMIT). Mr. Wyka appointed Mosi Dayani, of the Savannah River Operations Office, to lead a verification team for this effort.

### **Scope of Review**

The verification team (the Team) will verify DOE's implementation of the requirements established in the Department's Implementation Plan for DNFSB Recommendation 98-1. This will include review of both DOE Headquarters and field actions described above. The Team will also review a sample of responses to the "legacy issues" identified in the implementation plan to ensure that the system for dealing with these issues is working effectively. Verification of the Corrective Action Tracking System (CATS) database is being handled by a separate team, as described in commitment 5.3.4 of the 98-1 Implementation Plan. The Team will review this report, which is scheduled for completion by March 1, 2000, to ensure adequate coordination between all parts of the implementation review. The Team will review line management application of the CATS as a tool to facilitate tracking, reporting, and closing of the issues.

Team deliverables are (1) a description of the verification approach, by the end of December,

1999 (this Review Plan), and (2) a report due June 1, 2000 documenting the results of the verification and any recommendations for further steps needed, if any, to complete implementation of an effective process.

### **Approach**

The Team will conduct its work by reviewing documentation and conducting interviews and observations. The Team will make use of ISM verification activities conducted by site teams to gather information on those field sites that are scheduled for review during January - April 2000. Their feedback (to be obtained on a schedule and in a format and level of detail mutually discussed and agreed upon with the verification team leader) will be included in our review and report conclusions. Phase 1 reviews will use Objective 1 and Phase 2 reviews will use Objective 2 of the attached CRADs. We expect the DOE subteam will be assigned responsibility for this portion of the review, but it is up to the team leader to determine which subteam will be used. Currently, 15 reviews are scheduled during this time frame at facilities under Chicago, Idaho, Nevada, Oakland, Ohio, and Oak Ridge Operations Offices, and at the Albany Research Center under Fossil Energy. The attached CRADs will be provided to the DOE Heads of Contracting Authority and to the ISM Team Leaders for these reviews, and a modified set will be provided as part of the recommendations in the team report for inclusion in the Team Leaders' Handbook.

For field offices that do not have ISM or EH-2 reviews scheduled during the next several months, such as Albuquerque, Rocky Flats, and Savannah River, our team will conduct other reviews as necessary in order to ensure an adequate sample. In addition, the team will review a sample of headquarters organizations including Defense Programs, Environmental Management, Science, and EH. To accomplish these reviews, trip(s) to Headquarters and other field sites will be necessary. In the attached CRADs, the Team has identified which verification activities it will complete itself and which activities it will pass back to ISM verification teams for input (i.e., those focused in the field).

Results of specific reviews performed under each CRAD will be incorporated into the final report, along with recommendations for improvement where appropriate. In order to ensure the adequacy of findings and recommendations, the results of the review will be coordinated with EH-2 and various line management organizations prior to issuance of the report.

Team communications will be primarily through phone calls, E-mails, and bi-weekly conference calls to discuss progress and make assignments. We anticipate that a face-to-face meeting may be necessary near the end of the review to ensure that findings are thoroughly discussed and that agreement is reached on documentation of findings and recommendations. Additional meetings may be scheduled as needed.

Process implementation will continue during the time the Team is conducting its review. For example, updates to field office and program office Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities documents are scheduled to be completed by March 1, 2000. A preliminary schedule is provided below; the detailed schedule will be adjusted as necessary to ensure that verification reviews for such activities are conducted after the expected implementation date, to make maximum use of

ISM and other reviews that are ongoing, and to provide a final report by the June 1 due date. To ensure that reviews are not done prematurely, each organization to be reviewed will be asked to verify that it believes the process is fully implemented before the review is done. If the organization states it is not ready, this will be noted and the review will be rescheduled as appropriate. If an extension to the June 1 date is needed, the Team will notify the SMIT Director at least a month in advance of the due date.

**Schedule:**

1. Develop verification plan and CRADs (this review plan).
2. Select sample EH-2 reviews and legacy issues to be reviewed. 1/21/00
3. Discuss review and provide CRADs to ISM Team Leaders and EH-2. 1/21/00
4. Review DOE-wide directives for effective inclusion of process requirements. 2/29/00
5. Verify inclusion of process requirements in organization FRA documents and QA plans. 4/15/00.
6. Complete review of HQ and field office implementation of process. 5/1/00
7. Coordinate findings and recommendations with line managers and EH-2, by 5/19/00
8. Draft report and briefing to SMIT director, by 5/20/99
9. Finalize report and recommendations. 6/1/00.

**Team membership**

The Team includes people from both Headquarters and field organizations. The team will be assisted by two advisors and two support persons provided by the SMIT team. Names and organizational affiliations are provided below. Brief biographical sketches are provided in Attachment 2.

Mosi Dayani, Savannah River Operations Office, Team Leader  
John Adachi, Chicago Operations Office  
Herbert Bohrer, Idaho Operations Office  
Rabi Singh, DP Headquarters  
Henry Himpler, EM Headquarters

Joseph Hassenfeldt, S-3.1 Headquarters (Advisor, 98-1 Implementation Plan)  
William E. Miller, EH-2 (Advisor, EH independent oversight process)  
Tom O'Brien, SMIT Team support  
Karen Edwards, SMIT Team support

## **CORE REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA AND REVIEW APPROACH DOCUMENTS**

The following core requirements were developed from the requirements in DOE's Implementation Plan in response to DNFSB Recommendation 98-1 and the fundamental attributes which support implementation of the Integrated Safety Management System. Each core requirement is accompanied by an explanatory paragraph which can be used to assist the team in tailoring a Criteria and Review Approach Document (CRAD) for a specific review. The elements of the explanatory paragraph, when developed into criteria for the CRAD, should ensure all the objectives of the Implementation Plan are met.

### **OBJECTIVE**

- 1. Implementation Plan requirements have been effectively included in DOE directives and implementing documents.**

### **Criteria**

1. Appropriate DOE directives are issued and available in the directives system, and appropriate implementing documents have been issued. The directives and implementing documents provide for a consistent and disciplined process, with clear assignment of responsibilities and authorities for developing and implementing CAPs in response to issues identified by EH-2. Revised directives and procedures do not duplicate or conflict with existing directives language. Documents to be reviewed include:
  - a.<sup>1</sup> DOE-wide directives, including DOE O 414.1A, DOE M 411.1-1A, DOE G 414.1-2, and DOE G 450.4-1, as appropriate.
  - b. PSO and field directives and documents, including lower-level FRA documents, QA Plans, and implementing procedures and instructions. HQ FRA documents are to be revised by January 14, 2000; Field FRA documents are to be complete by March 1, 2000, and field changes to QA plans are due January 4, 2000.
2. Revised directives and procedures include requirements for (1) the preparation of formal CAPs in response to EH-2 issues; (2) elevation of safety, technical, managerial, budget, prioritization, timeliness, inadequate response or other issues for resolution; and (3) effective use of CATs; and identification and dissemination of lessons learned consistent with ISM implementation.
3. Changes to the directives and procedures provide for efficient integration and functioning of corrective action programs responding to safety issues identified by EH-2 with other

---

<sup>1</sup>This criteria does not apply to field reviews



corrective action programs, in line with integrated safety management objectives.

4. DOE field offices have a process for ensuring that contractors do what is necessary to meet obligations of this program.

### Approach

The verification team will review the DOE FRAM, appropriate DOE-wide directives, selected PSO FRA documents, QA plans, and various other implementing documents to ensure that appropriate changes have been made.

The verification team will sample DOE field office directives and FRA documents at selected sites to ensure that appropriate changes have been made. For these offices, they will also review documentation to verify that field offices have ensured that contractors appropriately respond to EH-2 issues. They will review contractor procedures to verify that they adequately address reporting, documentation, tracking, and prioritization of corrective actions resulting from EH-2 reviews and the CATs system.

ISMS Verification teams will review DOE field office directives and FRA documents to ensure that appropriate changes have been made. For these offices, they will also review documentation to verify that field offices have ensured that contractors appropriately respond to EH-2 issues. They will review contractor procedures to verify that they adequately address reporting, documentation, tracking, and prioritization of corrective actions resulting from EH-2 reviews and the CATs system.

### OBJECTIVE

2. **The process for addressing and resolving safety issues identified by EH-2 as outlined in directives and procedures has been effectively applied at headquarters and in the field.**

### Criteria

1. The process was followed (both applicable DOE-wide and local requirements, if any). Reviews were done, corrective action plans were developed, and any issues were pointed out for improvement. Each organization understands its responsibility and did their part in conducting reviews and developing and approving corrective action plans within established time frames.
2. Safety issues were addressed, resolved, and verified adequately and in a timely manner. Each organization did their part in implementing, reviewing, and closing issues, and closure was independently verified.
3. Resultant corrective actions are being applied to similar hazardous conditions at other facilities, sites, or programs.

4. Repeated problems of the same type have not been identified in subsequent reviews at the same site/facilities (i.e., the problems were actually fixed).

### Approach

#### *Record Reviews:*

The verification team will review (1) the Secretary's Quarterly Reports on Corrective Action Status for coverage of identified issues, (2) a sample of Office of Oversight assessment reports issued since April 1999, and (3) a sample of legacy issues identified and entered into CATs. This will include review of at least one multi-organization, multi-Cognizant Secretarial Officer safety issue, EH-2 individual site reports for selected field offices, and a sample of legacy issues for these offices.

ISMS Verification Teams will review any EH-2 individual site reports for field offices that are being reviewed during January-April 2000.

#### *Interviews:*

The verification team will interview DOE Headquarters personnel responsible for development and use of the Secretary's Quarterly Report on Corrective Action Status to determine its usefulness and future plans for its use.

The verification team will interview EH-2, PSO and selected field office and contractor line managers and safety personnel to discuss how particular issues were handled and whether any problems were identified in the process. If problems were identified, how were these addressed, and are there any recommendations for improvement in the process. Also, the process for reviewing and applying lessons learned at other sites will be discussed.

ISMS Verification Teams will interview selected field office and contractor line managers and safety personnel to discuss how particular issues were handled and whether any problems were identified in the process. If problems were identified, how were these addressed, and are there any recommendations for improvement in the process. Also, the process for reviewing and applying lessons learned at other sites will be discussed.

#### *Observations:*

The verification team and ISMS Verification Teams, for assigned organizations: If possible observe actual discussions (including meetings involving the development of CAPs) within and between contractors and DOE field offices, and between DOE field offices and HQ organizations, to observe the practical application and results of the procedures.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES REVIEW TEAM

### **Team Members:**

**Mosi Dayani**, Team Leader. Mosi Dayani is currently the senior technical advisor on Standards and Regulatory Programs at the U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office. He is also program manager for the development and implementation of the site-wide Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS). His responsibilities include the site's Standards/Requirements Identification Document and implementation of environment, safety, and health standards, regulations, and DOE directives, including the Price-Anderson nuclear safety Rules. He is also the DOE-SR member of the Safety Management Implementation Team (SMIT). Mosi has 20 years of experience in defense and civilian nuclear industry in the areas of systems engineering and project and program management.

**John Adachi**. John is employed by DOE's Chicago Operations Office as a Safety and Technical Services/Senior QA Engineer. He also serves as Chicago's ISMS Coordinator. John has a B.S. degree in Civil Engineering from the Illinois Institute of Technology; 1976 and an M.S. in Management of Technology from the National Technological University; 1995. Work experience includes 11 years in the commercial nuclear power industry prior to joining DOE in 1988. He has served on accident investigation teams and a number of ISMS verification teams, including two as team leader.

**Herbert A. Bohrer**. Mr. Bohrer is currently serving as Director of ES&H Oversight for the DOE-ID Office of Program Execution. In this role he is responsible for the coordination of line management oversight conducted by DOE-ID as well as for oversight of performance monitoring and trend analysis activities. Mr. Bohrer has over thirty-five years of nuclear experience beginning in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion program. He has served in a variety of operations line management positions as well as in ES&H management positions. He has participated in a variety of assessment activities throughout his career. He has been employed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, EG&G Idaho, Science Applications International Corporation, and Lockheed-Martin prior to joining the Department of Energy. Mr. Bohrer holds a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Oklahoma.

**Henry P. Himpler, Jr.** Mr. Himpler is employed by DOE's EM-5 Safety & Health Team. He is the newly designated Environmental Management member of the Safety Management Implementation Team (SMIT) and a designated Verification Team Leader. He is also a certified Quality Assurance Lead Auditor who has led (or participated in) many audits, assessments, and Operational Readiness Reviews since 1985. Although he did not join DOE until 1991 as a manager in the Nuclear Energy self-assessment program, he has supported DOE since 1978 in a number of Technical Support Capacities while employed by the ARINC Research Corporation and the SCIENTECH Corporation.

He joined Environmental Management in 1994 as a Quality Assurance Manager in the Office of Waste Management and subsequently became Safety and Health Team Leader from 1996 until the current EM reorganization.

Mr. Himpler began his professional career in 1955 after U.S. Navy Korean War service. He worked for over twenty years as an equipment designer, test engineer, and Engineering and Maintenance Manager for Westinghouse Electric, General Electric, and Raytheon Companies in radar, sonar, and telecommunications specialties. He subsequently became a consultant for the Navy Tomahawk Cruise Missile and Sonobuoy programs and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in Reliability and Cost Effectiveness technical support. He became dedicated to DOE and Energy R&D programs beginning in 1978.

Mr. Himpler holds undergraduate degrees in Electrical Engineering and Industrial Technology from Johns Hopkins University and Roger Williams University, respectively.

**Rabindra N. Singh**, Assistant to the Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Technical Support, Defense Programs. Mr. Singh has twenty six years of broad-based engineering, management, and safety assessment experience in the nuclear field (commercial nuclear power plants and the nuclear weapons complex). This includes ten years in the commercial nuclear industry, seven at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and nine at the Department of Energy. Most recently, Mr. Singh led a Department wide effort to improve the efficiency of line Environment, Safety, and Health oversight. The effort resulted in DOE P450.5, Line Environment, Safety and Health Oversight Policy. Mr. Singh has Masters degrees in Mechanical Engineering and Business Administration, and is a Registered Professional Engineer.

#### **Advisors and Support:**

**Karen Edwards**, consultant. Karen has been with Pegasus Consulting Corporation for nearly four years, with assignments for DOE's SMIT Team, the Headquarters directives group, the EH-10 enforcement group, Savannah River Operations, Oak Ridge Operations, Albuquerque Operations, and several DOE contractors. Previously she was employed at DOE's Oak Ridge Operations for more than 25 years. During the last 5 years she headed up a group responsible for developing and implementing programs for standards identification, compliance assessments against directives requirements, coordinating Price-Anderson implementation planning activities, and other matters associated with directives and standards. She was a charter member of the Department Standards Committee, served on the group that developed the implementation plan for DNFSB recommendation 95-2, the Rules Implementation Steering Group, the 90-2 Steering Group, the Directives System Improvement Process, and other DOE-wide policy-setting groups. She holds a bachelor's degree and additional graduate course work in labor economics, Russian language, literature, and area studies.

**Joseph J. Hassenfeldt**. Joe holds a Bachelor of Science Degree from the U.S. Naval Academy, where he graduated with Merit in 1986. He entered the Navy's Nuclear Propulsion Program and served as a Division Officer on a TRIDENT class Ballistic Missile Submarine. In 1991, he joined the Department of Energy's New Production Reactors (NPR) Program as a Nuclear

Engineer guiding and reviewing Heavy Water Reactor design.

Joe was DOE's Action Officer for the development of DOE's Business Management Oversight Pilot, the process by which performance expectations are developed, self-assessed, and overseen by the Field and Headquarters offices. This is the model upon which Policy 450.5, *Line ES&H Oversight*, was based.

From 1994 to 1999, Joe led the Department's Facility Representative Program for the Office of Field Management, including liaison with the DNFSB, policy development, and program improvements. Joe now works in the Office of the Departmental Representative to the DNFSB, on safety issues regarding Pantex, the Chicago Operations Office, and the National Labs, specifically, DNFSB recommendations 98-1, 98-2, and 99-1.

**William E. Miller.** Mr. Miller is an Operations Technical Advisor in the Office of EH Residents with the Office of Oversight of the U.S. Department of Energy. He has responsibility to coordinate and provide technical and administrative support to the EH Residents at three field locations which are Rocky Flats, Los Alamos and Oakland. Previous to this assignment, Mr. Miller Provided within DOE Defense Programs oversight for ES&H issues for several Los Alamos National Laboratory facilities when assigned to the Office of Research Development and Test Facilities. He also led and participated in several Defense Programs Technical Safety Appraisals while with the Office of Inspections. Mr. Miller spent five years in nuclear submarine engineering in the Navy and worked for seven years in commercial nuclear power with the New York Power Authority during which he obtained his NRC Senior Reactor Operator's License. He holds a degree in mechanical engineering from Cornell University.

**Thomas O'Brien.** Twenty-nine years' experience in the management of facility operations and in the areas of maintenance, logistics, technical procedure development, regulatory compliance and training. Directed an industrial production facility employing 1,300 personnel. Organized and developed the staff of a newly chartered office responsible for cost, schedule and technical performance of classified research, development and acquisition programs and successfully promoted the programs during complex budget negotiations. Participated in a Congressionally-directed cost and operational effectiveness analysis of a major defense acquisition program. Conducted oversight of the operations, maintenance, logistics, personnel readiness and training of twelve pressurized water reactor plants for over two years. Monitored volume reduction, packaging, and transshipment preparations for low-level radioactive waste and ensured compliance with all local, state and DOT regulations.

For the last three years, as a Vista Technologies, Inc., employee, Mr. O'Brien has been providing technical and administrative support to the Director, Safety Management Implementation Team, while supporting and promoting DOE's Integrated Safety Management Program across the DOE complex. Prior to his current task, Mr. O'Brien was employed by Coleman Research Corporation as a "Conduct of Operations" expert supporting the FERMCO Waste Management Division at DOE's Fernald Environmental Management Project and as a technical expert supporting DOE's Office of Environmental Management at DOE Headquarters. Prior to that assignment, he was Director, Government and International Programs for the Field Operations and Training Division

of Halliburton NUS Corporation, where he coordinated, managed and provided oversight of all government and international program activities of the division and served successfully for 18 months as the day-to-day program manager of an international, defense-related program requiring frequent diplomatic coordination with an on-site project team and the Washington, DC embassy of the nation involved.

## POTENTIAL EH-2 ASSESSMENTS FOR REVIEW SAMPLE

### Non-Legacy EH-2 Oversight Assessments

1. EH-2 "Non-Legacy" Assessments (i.e., issues specifically identified in reports and required CAPs developed per 98-1)
  - NTS Focused Safety Management Evaluation – April 1999
  - RFETS Focused Safety Management Evaluation – March 1999
  - Focused Review of the Yucca Mountain Project – April – May 1999
  - BNL Focused Safety Management Evaluation – June 1999
  - Focused Review of the SRS – November 1999
  - Phase I Independent Investigation of the PGDP – October 1999 (EM, ORO/PSO, BJ)
  - Follow-up Review of ISM Implementation at LANSCE – (Target date: Dec 1999)
2. EH-2 Assessments with specific issues identified in report and CAP developed in response (Transitioning Phase in Recognition of 98-1 Recent Issuance)
  - Y-12 Safety Management Evaluation – December 1998

### Organizations Involved in CAP Development and Implementation

1. EH-2 Assessments (from above) that required the Principle DOE Headquarters Program Office, Operations Office/Area Office and the contractor to develop a CAP
  - NTS Focused Safety Management Evaluation – DP, NV, BN
  - RFETS Focused Safety Management Evaluation – EM, RFFO, K-H
  - BNL Focused Safety Management Evaluation – SC, CH/BHG, BNL
  - Phase I Independent Investigation of the PGDP – EM, ORO/PSO, BJ
2. EH-2 Assessments (from above) that required only the Operations Office/Area Office and the contractor to develop a CAP
  - Focused Review of the Yucca Mountain Project – YMSCO, TRW
  - Focused Review of the SRS – SR, WSRC
  - Y-12 Safety Management Evaluation – OR/YSO, LMES
  - Follow-up Review of ISM Implementation at LANSCE – AL/LAAO, LANL  
(Note: CAP development will have to be coordinated with DOE ISMV and DOE Off-Ramp assessment findings)

3. EH-2 Assessments (from above) that cited issues within the report that required the involvement/coordination of more than one Program Office

- NTS Focused Safety Management Evaluation – DP, EM, NN (Note: In addition, NV had to coordinate with AL and OAK Operations Office due to complex arrangement of LANL and LLNL has primary users)
- BNL Focused Safety Management Evaluation – SC, NE, EM
- Phase I Independent Investigation of the PGDP – EM, NE
- Y-12 Safety Management Evaluation – DP, EM, SC (Note: Issue involves implementation of Oak Ridge Emergency Management Reservation Plan)

DOE Complex-Wide/Generic Issues

EH Assessments/Reports citing Complex-wide Generic Issues in CATS

- Independent Oversight Evaluation of Emergency Management Programs Across the DOE Complex – July 1998
- Independent Oversight Review of Aviation Safety in the Department of Energy – October 1996
- Independent Oversight of the Department of Energy Quality Assurance Program for Suspect/Counterfeit Parts – May 1996, Revision 1
- Selected Type A Accident Investigation Judgments Of Need

Ongoing Reviews

- Type A Y-12 Accident Investigation Report, January 2000 (scheduled)
- Phase I Independent Investigation of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, April 2000 (scheduled)