

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 8, 2019

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Timothy L. Hunt, Acting Resident Inspector  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending March 8, 2019

**Material Staging Facility (MSF) Conceptual Design (Critical Decision-1) Charrette:** This week, representatives from DOE headquarters, NNSA, NPO, CNS, and Parsons Enterprise Construction Management Services (ECMS) met at Pantex to commence a collaborative effort to define requirements for the MSF. The charrette objectives included gathering data, determining facility requirements, identifying constraints, and specifying site/space utilization. Representatives from the stakeholder organizations provided significant feedback to ECMS—the project management contractor—on locating the MSF and its support facilities, container storage requirements, utilities and infrastructure needs, and life safety concerns. The charrette report, due in April 2019, will form the basis for the final conceptual design. The final conceptual design report is due in August 2019.

**Lockout/Tagout (LO/TO) Violation:** During replacement of the fire alarm control panels (FACP) servicing the 12-98 cells, the NPO facility representative and acting resident inspector found that two of the three DANGER tags attached to the locked out circuit breakers in the power panel feeding the FACPs, and the DANGER tag on the lockbox, were misapplied. The tag for the lockbox was hung on one of the circuit breakers, one of the circuit breaker tags was hung on the lockbox, and another circuit breaker tag was hung on the incorrect breaker. The tags were filled out and signed by all required signatories prior to taking them to the locations where they were to be installed. The LO/TO process requires independent verification and sign-off by a second craftsperson after the locks and tags are hung to ensure they are properly applied. The actions resulted in a noncompliance with the Pantex hazardous energy control procedure. Work on the FACP upgrade was paused until partial removal and reinstallation of the DANGER tags on the correct equipment could be completed.

**Implementation of Falling Man Control in Nuclear Explosive Bays:** An NPO facility representative and the acting resident inspector observed implementation of the falling man controls in a nuclear explosive bay. The controls only became effective recently (see 3/1/2019 report) and the production technicians in this bay were implementing the controls for the first time. Each of the five production technicians independently read the falling man awareness safety requirements prior to performing operations and exhibited an attentiveness to the controls when in the vicinity of, or approaching, the unit.

**Authorization to Perform Maintenance in Nuclear Explosive Facilities:** The acting resident inspector walked down three nuclear explosive bays with the CNS facility representative and cognizant production section manager in anticipation of monthly preventive maintenance on the radiation alarm monitoring system (RAMS). The objective was to confirm that the facility conditions and configuration were acceptable to perform maintenance and all materials were properly located/protected. In one bay, a unit was within the required standoff distance from the RAMS equipment and could not be immediately moved; work will not be authorized in that bay until the unit is moved outside the ten-foot standoff distance.