

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 28, 2018

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** M. T. Sautman and Z. C. McCabe, Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending September 28, 2018

**Emergency Preparedness (EP):** A resident inspector observed control room activities for the annual evaluated EP exercise for K-Area. The scenario simulated a truck driver having a medical emergency, striking a security officer with the truck, and then crashing the truck. This causes a simulated fire that involves the 55-gallon drum of transuranic waste he was transporting. The RI also observed the field response for a drill at F/H Laboratory involving a forklift fire, a breached waste container, and an unconscious, contaminated driver. In general, the emergency responses for the exercise and drill were satisfactory although a few aspects of the field response during the drill were a little slow.

**Savannah River National Laboratory:** Contamination was found on the shoe of a worker when he used a personnel contamination monitor to exit a radiological buffer area. He had been operating a crane for the shielded cells inside a high contamination area/airborne radioactivity area, but previous surveys of him and subsequent surveys of his personnel protective equipment did not find any contamination. The isotopes found on the contamination did not match either the sample he was working with or the waste being handled nearby, but were consistent with those found in the work area. Extensive surveys of his walking path and the surrounding area did not identify a source or further spread of the contamination.

**A-Area Fire Water Tank:** Last week SRNS awarded the contract for procurement of the general service fire water tank in A-Area, which will eventually replace the degraded existing safety significant tank (see 6/10/2016–6/24/2016, 7/29/2016, 8/16/2016, and 10/28/2016 weekly reports).

**Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF):** Tritium personnel developed a set of corrective actions as a result of the numerous shortcomings associated with the use of a wire clothes hanger to remove an end cap from a modified gloveport valve in TEF (see 9/14/2018 report). Tritium personnel have utilized conduct of operations (ConOps) coaches to provide more oversight over first line managers. Through these observations, Tritium personnel identified an apparent gap between expectations and implementation of when to call a timeout and how to document it. As such, one of the corrective actions is to document (and implement) those expectations in the Tritium ConOps procedure. Additionally, Tritium personnel have performed an extent of condition review of other modified gloveports in storage and found that each of the 14 had an issue with the cap. Further investigation led to the determination that the caps were being over-tightened when assembled. To prevent reoccurrence, tritium personnel are revising the drawings and work instructions for the modified gloveports.

**Oral Board:** The resident inspector observed a successful initial oral board for a control room operator at an SRNS facility. The resident inspector noted several questions related to recent events at the facility and lessons learned from previous oral boards.