

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 23, 2018

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: P. Fox, Hanford Resident Inspector
SUBJECT: Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending February 23, 2018

105-KW Basin. The contractor resumed their Operational Readiness Review (ORR) to support sludge retrieval using the Engineered Container Retrieval and Transfer System (see Activity Report 2/2/2018). During operational demonstrations, the contractor ORR team noted that the general format and complexity of the procedures make them difficult for the operators to follow. It was their opinion that these problems could lead to potential operator errors. Based on that observation, contractor management decided to pause the ORR to support further review and modification of the procedures in order to reduce the potential for operator error and improve their ability to perform safe and successful sludge retrieval operations. The Resident Inspector observed some of the operational demonstrations and notes that the ORR team's observation was accurate and that the contractor's decision to pause the ORR to allow further work on the procedures appears appropriate.

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The contractor held a critique to determine facts and identify potential causes for the recent violation of a material management specific administrative control (SAC) that provides programmatic requirements to ensure that plutonium inventories, locations, packaging, and work control restrictions are maintained (see Activity Report 2/16/2018). The critique determined that the work procedure that the demolition team used to remove and stage strongbacks from the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) canyon did not provide adequate direction regarding implementation of the SAC. That shortcoming, along with an informal tracking method used in the field to support the staging effort resulted in confusion regarding the placement of some of the strongback material. The contractor is working to restore compliance with the SAC and will identify and implement corrective actions to prevent future occurrences.

The contractor continues to work recovery actions related to the contamination spreads that occurred in December during demolition of the PRF (see Activity Report 12/22/2018). This week, DOE-RL expanded the list of activities that the contractor is allowed to perform in support of stabilization. The list now includes activities necessary to modify boundaries and setup or modify facilities and utilities to support the new boundaries. The list also includes some activities that support the necessary management and movement of waste packages.

Tank Farms. The contractor completed a transfer of waste from double shell tank (DST) AP-106 to DST AW-106. This transfer supports setup for a 242-A evaporator campaign that is scheduled to occur in June.

222-S Laboratory. The contractor conducted a field exercise to fulfill the annual exercise requirement for the 222-S Laboratory Complex Facility Emergency Response Organization. The exercise scenario simulated damage to a waste drum that contained sufficient material at risk to be classified at the Alert level. The scenario also required response to a medical emergency within the affected area.