


John T. Conway, Chairman
A.J. Eggenberger, Vice Chairman
Edson G. Case
John W. Crawford, Jr.
Herbert John Cecil Kouts

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 208-6400 • FTS 268-6400



December 19, 1991

The Honorable James D. Watkins
Secretary of Energy
Washington, D.C. 20585

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On December 19, 1991, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2286a(5), approved Recommendation 91-5 which is enclosed for your consideration.

42 U.S.C. § 2286d(a) requires the Board, after receipt by you, to promptly make this recommendation available to the public in the Department of Energy's regional public reading rooms. The Board believes the recommendation contains no information which is classified or otherwise restricted. To the extent this recommendation does not include information restricted by DOE under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161-68, as amended, please arrange to have this recommendation promptly placed on file in your regional public reading rooms.

The Board intends to publish this recommendation in the Federal Register.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John T. Conway".

John T. Conway
Chairman

Enclosure

RECOMMENDATION TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
pursuant to Section 312(5) of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

Dated: December 19, 1991

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (the Board) has been conducting an ongoing review of the bases and criteria for the operational plans for the K-reactor at the Savannah River Site. These plans currently include limitation of the power of the reactor to 30 percent of the historical full power, or to approximately 720 megawatts (MW). The information reviewed has been provided to the Board in numerous briefings and documents, including the Savannah River K Production Reactor Safety Analysis Report (WSRC-SA-10003).


The Board concluded on the basis of this information that operation of the K-reactor at a power level not exceeding 30 percent of the nominal historical maximum power would impose no undue risk to public health and safety assuming that all other improvement measures established as necessary for startup have been completed and effectively implemented. In this connection, the Board has been stationing members of its staff and some of its outside experts at the Savannah River Site during the period of restart to monitor the activities during restart and initial power ascension of the K-reactor with the initial reactor configuration.

Information in the K-14-1 Core Operations Report (September, 1991), and some of the Reactor Operations Management Plan (ROMP) closure packages implies that at a later time the Department of Energy may wish to increase the operating power level of the K-reactor above the 30 percent value. However, the Board is of the opinion that the existing information on the effectiveness of the engineered safety features, especially those that would be relied on in the event of a large loss-of-coolant accident, does not at present support operation at a power level much above the 30 percent value. The Board considers that justification of any increase in power would require further refinement of the thermal-hydraulic evidence on the cooling capability of the emergency cooling systems under accident conditions. Therefore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2286b(d), DOE shall inform the Board well before any decision to increase the reactor's power level above 30 percent of the historical value of its maximum full power. Furthermore, if such an increase in operating power is to be contemplated by the DOE, the Board recommends that:

1. The DOE should conduct more definitive studies on the thermal-hydraulic methodology, criteria, and experimental test program used in analyzing performance of core cooling of the K-reactor during unusual conditions that could

prevail during accidents. These studies should more fully reflect prototypical geometry and accident conditions (temperature, flow, pressure, and configuration).

2. Any proposal to operate the K-reactor at a level above the 30 percent value should be supported by accident analysis based on the thermal-hydraulic methodology revised in accordance with the above.
3. The evaluation model for analysis of postulated loss of coolant accidents should be documented and controlled in accordance with the procedures described in 10 C.F.R. § 50.46 (1991). Similar controls should be implemented for models used in analyzing non-LOCA accidents.



John T. Conway

protection standards. A critical aspect of DOE's review should be an assessment of management's involvement and effectiveness in implementing radiation protection programs and management's ability to communicate the steps to be taken to implement an effective radiation protection program to all levels within relevant DOE and contractor units, particularly within line organizations.

5. DOE focus its efforts relating to reporting of occurrences to enhance the usefulness of the Occurrence Reporting (OR) system as a tool for enhancing radiological health and safety at DOE facilities, by emphasizing determination of root causes and management follow-up of lessons learned.

6. DOE compare (a) its operating contractor practices and procedures, and (b) DOE radiological protection standards with the guidance used by other government, commercial, and professional organizations. The documents which DOE should use for this study and comparison include, at a minimum, this listed in the attachment to those recommendation. While the Board does not necessarily endorse any of the listed documents in their entirety, it believes they are important sources of government, commercial, and professional opinion on radiological protection standards, procedures, and practices. As such, they serve as valuable tools for identifying improvements needed in DOE's programs.

7. After completion of the study recommended in item 6, DOE identify any supplemental measures that are necessary or appropriate to compensate for the differences identified between practices which conform to the guidance enumerated above and actual operating contractor practices; and between standards and procedures listed and DOE standards and procedures for radiation protection at defense nuclear facilities.

John T. Conway,
Chairman

Attachment

1. 29 CFR part 1910 "Occupational Safety and Health Standards".
2. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guides Division 8 Series "Occupational Health".
3. NUREG-0041 "Manual of Respiratory Protection Against Airborne Radioactive Materials".
4. American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard Z38.2 of 1950 "Practices for Respiratory Protection".
5. "Guidelines for Radiological Protection at Nuclear Power Stations"

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), INPO 88-010.

3. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 60 "1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection," 21 Annals of the ICRP No. 1-3, 1991 Pergamon Press.

7. NRC, Draft Regulatory Guide 8.1, "Radiation Protection Programs for Nuclear Power Plants" (Implements revised 10 CFR part 20) (Draft RG no. DG-8004 was noticed for public comments in 56 Fed. Reg. 56071, 11/6/91).

8. NCRP Report No. 91 "Recommendations on Limits for Exposure to Ionizing Radiation," National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements 1987.

9. Other relevant commercial or private standards and practices, including NCRP publications.

Appendix—Transmittal Letter to the Secretary of Energy

December 19, 1991.

The Honorable James D. Watkins,
Secretary of Energy, Washington, DC 20585.

Dear Mr. Secretary: On December 19, 1991, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 2286a(5), approved Recommendation 91-6 which is enclosed for your consideration. The Board is aware that the Department has just proposed rules in the Federal Register concerning Radiation Protection for Occupational Workers, 56 FR 6334 (Dec. 6, 1991). Recommendation 91-6 deals with radiation protection issues throughout the DOE defense nuclear facilities complex.

42 U.S.C. 2286d(s) requires the Board, after receipt by you, to promptly make this recommendation available to the public in the Department of Energy's regional public reading rooms. The Board believes the recommendation contains no information which is classified or otherwise restricted. To the extent this recommendation does not include information restricted by DOE under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2161-68, as amended, please arrange to have this recommendation promptly placed on file in your regional public reading rooms.

The Board intends to publish this recommendation in the Federal Register.

Sincerely,

John T. Conway,

Chairman.

[FR Doc. 91-35836 Filed 12-26-91; 8:45 am]

CALLING CODE 6820-KD-W

[Recommendation 91-5]

Power Limits for K-Reactor Operation at the Savannah River Site

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice, recommendation.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a concerning power limits for K-Reactor Operation at the Savannah River Site. The Board requests public comments on this recommendation.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation are due on or before January 27, 1992.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth M. Pusateri or Carole J. Council, at the address above or telephone (202) 208-6400.

Dated: December 20, 1991.

John T. Conway,

Chairman.

Power Limits for K-Reactor Operations at the Savannah River Site

Dated: December 19, 1991.

[Recommendation 91-5]

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (the Board) has been conducting an ongoing review of the bases and criteria for the operational plans for the K-reactor at the Savannah River Site. These plans currently include limitation of the power of the reactor to 30 percent of the historical full power, or to approximately 720 megawatts (MW). The information reviewed has been provided to the Board in numerous briefings and documents, including the Savannah River K Production Reactor Safety Analysis Report (WSRC-SA-10003).

The Board concluded on the basis of this information that operation of the K-reactor at a power level not exceeding 30 percent of the nominal historical maximum power would impose no undue risk to public health and safety assuming that all other improvement measures established as necessary for startup have been completed and effectively implemented. In this connection, the Board has been stationing members of its staff and some of its outside experts at the Savannah River Site during the period of restart to monitor the activities during restart and initial power ascension of the K-reactor with the initial reactor configuration.

Information in the K-14-1 Core Operations Report (September, 1991), and some of the Reactor Operations Management Plan (ROMP) closure

packages implies that at a later time the Department of Energy may wish to increase the operating power level of the K-reactor above the 30 percent value. However, the Board is of the opinion that the existing information on the effectiveness of the engineered safety features, especially those that would be relied on in the event of a large loss-of-coolant accident, does not at present support operation at a power level much above the 30 percent value. The Board considers that justification of any increase in power would require further refinement of the thermal-hydraulic evidence on the cooling capability of the emergency cooling systems under accident conditions. Therefore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286b(d), DOE shall inform the Board well before any decision to increase the reactor's power level above 30 percent of the historical value of its maximum full power. Furthermore, if such an increase in operating power is to be contemplated by the DOE, the Board recommends that:

1. The DOE should conduct more definitive studies on the thermal-hydraulic methodology, criteria, and experimental test program used in analyzing performance of core cooling of the K-reactor during unusual conditions that could prevail during accidents. These studies should more fully reflect prototypical geometry and accident conditions (temperature, flow, pressure, and configuration).

2. Any proposal to operate the K-reactor at a level above the 30 percent value should be supported by accident analysis based on the thermal-hydraulic methodology revised in accordance with the above.

3. The evaluation model for analysis of postulated loss of coolant accidents should be documented and controlled in accordance with the procedures described in 10 CFR 50.46 (1991). Similar controls should be implemented for models used in analyzing non-LOCA accidents.

John T. Conway.

Appendix—Transmittal Letter to the Secretary of Energy

December 19, 1991.

The Honorable James D. Watkins,
Secretary of Energy, Washington, DC 20585.

Dear Mr. Secretary: On December 19, 1991, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 2286a(5), approved Recommendation 91-5 which is enclosed for your consideration.

42 U.S.C. 2286d(a) requires the Board, after receipt by you, to promptly make this recommendation available to the public in the Department of Energy's regional public reading rooms. The Board believes the recommendation contains no information which is classified or otherwise restricted. To

the extent this recommendation does not include information restricted by DOE under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2161-68, as amended, please arrange to have this recommendation promptly placed on file in your regional public reading rooms.

The Board intends to publish this recommendation in the Federal Register.

Sincerely,

John T. Conway.

Chairman

[FR Doc. 91-30885 Filed 12-26-91; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6820-KD-M

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

National Assessment Governing Board; Teleconference Meeting

AGENCY: National Assessment Governing Board; Education.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the schedule and proposed agenda of a forthcoming teleconference meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Assessment Governing Board. This notice also describes the functions of the Board. Notice of this meeting is required under section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. This document is intended to notify the general public of their opportunity to attend.

DATES: January 13, 1992.

TIME: 11 a.m. (e.t.).

PLACE: National Assessment Governing Board, suite 7322, 1100 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Roy Truby, Executive Director, National Assessment Governing Board, suite 7322, 1100 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 20005-4013, telephone: (202) 357-6930.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The National Assessment Governing Board is established under section 408(i) of the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) as amended by section 3403 of the National Assessment of Educational Progress Improvement Act (NAEP Improvement Act), title III-C of the Augustus F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments of 1988 (Pub. L. 100-297), (20 U.S.C. 1221e-1).

The Board is established to advise the Commissioner of the National Center for Education Statistics on policies and actions needed to improve the form and use of the National Assessment of Educational Progress, and develop specifications for the design, methodology, analysis, and reporting of test results. The Board also is responsible for selecting subject areas to

be assessed, identifying the objectives for each age and grade tested, and establishing standards and procedures for interstate and national comparisons. The Executive Committee of the National Assessment Governing Board will meet via teleconference call on January 13, 1992 at 11 a.m. (e.t.). The proposed agenda includes: (1) Discussion of the status of the Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Education; (2) review of the Reporting and Dissemination Committee's recommendations regarding the NCES plans for disseminating the new NAEP reports; and (3) review of the National Academy of Education's evaluation of NAEP. Records are kept of all Board proceedings and are available for public inspection at the U.S. Department of Education, National Assessment Governing Board, suite 7322, 1100 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, from 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.

Dated: December 20, 1991.

Diane Ravitch.

Assistant Secretary and Counselor to the Secretary.

[FR Doc. 91-30909 Filed 12-26-91; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4000-01-M

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Wetlands Involvement Notification for Proposed Construction of an Industrial Waste Landfill at the Department of Energy's Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, TN

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of wetlands involvement and opportunity to comment.

SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) proposes to construct a new landfill for disposal of industrial waste and dewatered bottom ash at the Y-12 Plant on the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. All activities related to the proposed project would occur within a restricted area of about 20 hectares (50 acres) on federally owned property.

In accordance with the DOE Regulations for Compliance With Floodplains/Wetlands Environmental Review Requirements (10 CFR part 1022), DOE will prepare a wetlands assessment which will be incorporated into the Environmental Assessment (EA) being prepared for the proposed landfill.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The proposed landfill would provide additional landfill capacity for disposal of industrial wastes generated by the